"A sentence is called a
'report sentence' if the empirical meaning-rules of one of the ordinary
languages of daily intercourse suffice in the presence of certain experiential
data for a decision about this sentences. Contrariwise, a sentence is called
an 'interpretation-sentence' if the presence of experiential data
none of the meaning-rules of ordinary language
suffice for a decision regarding it, but, once certain new meaning-rules
have been added to those of ordinary language, there are experiential data
in whose presence ched system of meaning-rules leads immediately or mediately
(i.e. in one or more steps) to a decision about this sentence. These additional
meaning-rules are called 'conventions', 'coordinative definitions', etc.
[...] If our conception of report- and intepretation-sentences is correct, then the only difference between them is this, that the rules of meaning of an ordinary language suffice for decision regarding report-sentences but do not suffice for any decision regarding interpretation-sentences, these last however being empirically decidable on the basis of the meaning-rules enriched by conventions."
("The World-Picture and the Conceptual Apparatus" (1934), in K. Ajdukiewicz, The Scientific World-Perspective and other Essays (1931-1963), ed. by J. Giedymin, Reidel, Dordrecht 1978, p. 78).
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