"The set of all meanings
which attach to the expressions of a closed and
connected language was called the conceptual apparatus. Thus
two conceptual apparatuses are either identical or entirely disjoint. It
was asserted that every meaning is an element of some conceptual apparatus"
("The World-Picture and the Conceptual Apparatus" (1934), in K. Ajdukiewicz, The Scientific World-Prspective and other Essays (1931-1963), ed. by J. Giedymin, Reidel, Dordrecht 1978, p. 69).
"If an epistemologist would
judge articulately (i.e. express his judgments in some language or other)
then he must employ some conceptual apparatus and submit himself
to the meaning rules of a language
coordinated with this conceptual apparatus. He cannot speak without speaking
some language; he cannot articolate judgments without grounding himself
in some conceptual apparatus. If he does in fact conform correctly to the
meaning-rules of a language, then he will be compelled to accept all sentences
to which the meaning-rules of the language (in combination with experiential
data) lead; and further, he will be compelled to declare these sentences
'true'. Of course, he can change his conceptual apparatus and his language.
But when he does this he is compelled to make other judgments, and to accept
other sentences and declare them 'true', although this second 'true' non
longer has the same meaning as the first. In any case, we see no possibility
for our epistemologist to take the neutral attitude of adopting no conceptual
apparatus at all. He is stuck in some skin, even though he can change his
skin like a chamaleon"
(Id., p. 84).
"The conceptual apparatus
is determined by the establishment of the meaning-rules"
(&laqno;The Scientific World-Perspective», in op.cit., p. 114)
"The totality of all sentences, dictated by the meaning-rules of a given language and by certain data of experience in one or other of the three ways indicated above [i.e. axiomatic, deductive and empirical meaning-rules] we call the world-perspective of that language, corresponding to those experiential data [....]
The world perspective is a function of two factors. On the one hand, it depends on the material of expereince, which is its foundations; on the other hand, it depends on the conceptual apparatus, and the meaning-rules that are bound up with it. [...] A change in conceptual apparatus is reflected in a change in the problems which one solves on the basis of the same data of experience. Different sciences make use of different conceptual structures whic can only partially coincide"
(Id., pp. 113-114. Translation modified)
Back to Ajdukiewicz main page