"There is a creative
element in every reasoning: this is most strongly manifested in explanation.
[...] The generalization 'every S is P' may be interpreted
either as a set of singular descriptions or as the relationship 'if something
is S, then it is P'. If a generalization is a set of singular
judgements, it covers not only those case which have been investigated,
but unknown case as well. By assuming that the unknown cases behave like
the known ones, we do not reproduce facts that are empirically given,
but we create new judgements on the model of judgements about known
If a generalization expresses a relationship, it introduces a factor that is alien to experience. Since Hume's time we have been permitted to say only that we perceive a coincidence or a sequence of events, but not a relationships between them. Thus a judgement about relationship does non reproduce facts that are empirically given, but again is a manifestation of man's creative thought"
(Creative elements in Science , in Selected Works, North Holland, Amsterdam 1970, pp.8-9)
"Indeed, we know that the
law governing the fall of heavy bodies can be true only in approximation,
since it supposes such non-existent conditions as a constant gravitational
acceleration or a lack of resistance offered by the air. Thus it does not
reproduce reality, but only refers to a fiction.
That is why history tells us that the law did not emerge from the observation of phenomena, but was born a priori in Galileo's creative mind. It was only after formulating his law that Galileo verified its consequences with facts. Such is the role of experience in every theory of natural science: to be a stimulus for creative ideas and to provide subjects for their verification"
(Ib., p. 9).
"All hypotheses are product
of the human mind, for a person who assumes a fact that is not empirically
confirmed creates something new. Hypotheses are permanent elements
of knowledge and not temporary ideas that by verification can be changed
into established truths. A judgements about a fact ceases to be a
hypothesis only if that fact can be confirmed by direct experience.
This happen only exceptionally. And to demonstrate that the consequences
of a hypothesis are in agrrement with facts does not mean turning a hypothesis
into a truth, for the truth of other reason does not follow from the truth
of the consequence".
(Ib., p. 10).
"[...] which scientific
judgements are pure reproductions of facts? For if generalizations,
laws, and hypotheses, and hence all the theories of the empirical sciences
and the entire sphere of the a priori sciences are the result of
the creative work of the human mind, then there are probably few
judgements in science that are purely reproductive.
The answer to this question appears to be easy. Only a singular statement about a fact which is directly given in experience can be a purely reproductive judgement, for instance: 'a pine grows here', 'this magnetic needle now deviates (from its previous position)', 'in this room there are two chairs'. But whoever investigates these judgements more closely will perhaps find creative elements even in them. The words 'pine', 'magnetic needle', and 'two' stand for concepts, and hence concealed labour of spirit through them. All the facts formulated in words are, primitively it may be, interpreted by me. A 'crude fact', untouched by the human mind, seems to be a limiting concept."
(Ib., pp. 12-3)
"[...] a collection of facts
is not a science. He is a true scientist who knows how to link facts into
syntheses. To do so it does not suffice to acquire the knwoledge of facts;
it is also necessary to contribute creative thought."
(Ib., p. 14)
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