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"The fondamental error in
many discussions from the field of epistemology is the (more or less open)
manipulation of the symbolic epistemological subject, known as 'human spirit',
human mind', 'research worker' or simply 'man' ('John', 'Socrates'), which
has no concrete living position, which does not basically undergo changes
even in the course of centuries and which represents every 'normal' man
regardles of the surroundings and the epoch. Thus it is to be absolute,
unchanging and general"
("The Problem of Epistemology" [1936], in R.S. Cohen and
T. Schnelle (eds.), Cognition and Fact - Materials on Ludwik Fleck,
Dordrecht, reidel, 1986, p. 79)
"To my mind epistemology
must result from three basic phenomena. The first is the collective
mental differentiation of men: people exist who can communicate with
each other, i.e., who think somehow similarly, belong, so to say, to the
same thought-group, and people exist who are completely unable to understand
each other and communicate with each other, as if the belong to different
thought-groups (thought-collectives). [...]
Another fundamental phenomenon of epistemology is the fact that the
circulation of thought is always related, in principle to its transformation
[...] Consequently, each formulated thought, which is destined for real
use, bears the sign of the producing unit and the address of destination.
Hence a formulated thought, an utterance, is a directional value, a vector
(if on can use this definition here): an abstract sentence, without the
sign of the producing unit and without the destination, and also without
any regard to those social forces which bring about its direction and circulation,
is incomplete and does not suit the purpose of the considerations of rational
epistemology. Only a sentence in its natural relevance, i.e. in its social
meaning within the society, possesses a definite meaning; an abstract sentence
can be understood in different manner: it can be equivocal or meaningless,
depending on the circle of the recipient.
If I formulate a certain idea for the members of another thought-collective,
I transform it so as to render it approximate to the style of that collective.
Thus I try to create a common collective, somewhat intermediary, poorer
in substance, but wider. I try to change the style of the given idea. Such
a formulation and transmission of an idea is called propaganda. [...]
The third fundamental phenomenon of epistemology is the existence of
a specific historical development of thinking, which cannot be reduced to
the logical development of thought-contents nor to the simple increase of
detailed information. [...] Thus notions undergo important changes.
these changes do not result from any analysis of sensations that would force
us to transformation them in a definite direction. They are not a logically
or objectively indispensable development of the thought [...] Of course,
the notions must not be considered to be a separate bricks which only for
themselves and out of which the given idea, from the entire collective of
ideas, from the continuous process of thinking. But even the isolated notions
show, as can be seen, a specific stylish coloring which is characteristic
of the given thought-style.
(Id., pp. 81, 85, 89-92)
"If epistemology is meant
to be a science capable of development, useful and rich in a substantial
way, it ought to broaden the range of its interests. It must not be limited
to the study of the domains and stages of sciences which are officially
recognized at the given moment, but, taking into account the variety of
thought-styles and the multiplicity of thought-collectives, it must become
a comparative science. Likewise it ought to take into account the
developmental moment and, while including the embryonic stages of
cognition, it should aim at the research methods of unclear, wavering and
indistinct cognition. It must take into account fundamentally and in detail
the social nature of thinking and cognition.
Conseguently it ought to include psychological, sociological and
historical methods. Its subject will be the whole of cognitive life,
its organization, fluctuations over time and developmental peculiarities,
local features, properties of its various forms; it will study pedagogic
methods from the epistemological viewpoint, it will find points touching
economics, technology (apparatus!), art and even politics.
Finally, it will take into account mythology and psychiatry.
Epistemology thus understood is a science of thought-styles"
(Ib., pp. 97-8)
