der Wijsbegeerte Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Dr Arianna Betti
Since December 2003, this page is renewed, and most of all, cut shorter. For instance, the list of papers is restricted mostly to those available online. The information I removed, especially if you are interested in the links, are still to be found here, as .pdf file. I have also a new Dutch page here , where you can download my full CV , including the complete publication list and a description of work in progress.
Doctoral degree in Philosophy of Science, 1999/2000,
Institute of Philosophy, Epistemology Branch, University of Genoa. PhD thesis:
Logica, verità e tempo nella filosofia austro-polacca [5600 word-English summary in pdf], prof. Michele
Laurea, 1994/95 (cum laude):University
of Florence, Department of Philosophy . Master
dissertation: Logica ed esistenza in
Stanislaw Lesniewski , Prof. Ettore Casari supervisor.
Logic as Universal Medium? On the Conceptions of Logic, Language and Truth in Lesniewski and Tarski Three-year Individual Postdoc (Vernieuwingsinmpuls, VENI) funded by the Dutch National Research Council (NWO)
"The Road from Vienna to Lvov - Twardowski's Theory of Judgement between 1894 and 1897" (with Maria van
der Schaar), Grazer Philosophische Studien 67, 2004, forthcoming.
This paper discusses Twardowski's theory of judgement on the basis of
the unpublished manuscript Logik 1894/5. Topics are time, relations,
states of affairs.
"Lesniewski's Early Liar, Tarski and Natural Language"
forthcoming on a special issue of Pure and Applied Logic (Elsevier, Amsterdam)
devoted to Alfred Tarski, ed. by D. Niwinski, J. Wolenski et al.
Main thesis: Lesniewski - and not his pupil Tarski - was the first to show
that natural language is incurably affected by contradictions, and only
by sanitizing it do we get an acceptable means of scientific investigation.
"The Incomplete Story of Lukasiewicz and Bivalence" [pdf],
in T. Childers & O. Majer (eds.), The Logica
Yearbook 2001, Praha, Filosofia, 2002, pp. 21-36.
This article deals with Lukasiewicz's rejection of the principle of the
excluded middle in his early phase (up to 1917). The claim is that his early
rejection of the excluded middle has nothing to do with his later rejection
of bivalence (1917). Topics include nominal (predicate, term) negation and
"Le donne nella filosofia analitica austriaca", in Donne e
filosofia, a cura di M. Marsonet, Genova, Erga, 2000, pp. 98-118.
A survey of women philosophers in the Vienna Circle (Rose Rand, Olga Taussky-Todd,
Olga Neurath) and in the Lvov-Warsaw School (Izydora Dambska, Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum,
Maria Kokoszynska-Lutmanowa and others).
Truth, Time and Logic - An Historico-systematic Investigation into the Austro-Polish Tradition
A comparative analysis of truth, time and logic with relevance both to historical and systematic debates. Its core will be a study of the metaphysics of truth in Austro-Polish philosophy in the light of modern theories. It will be based in part on a major revision of my doctoral dissertation in Italian. Monograph in English of approximately 300 pages for a wide audience of philosophers.
[Get the table of contents ]
Papers presented only in Lectures
"A Plea for Presentism" (Univ. Utrecht, The Netherlands, February 2004). Scheduled.
Abstract. Presentism plays an important role in the contemporary debate on truth and
time. It is, as it were, the common- sense view. For some present-day
thinkers, however, it is plainly "absurd". Is it worth defending? I think
it is. Roughly put, presentism is the thesis that only present objects
exist. In this talk my aim is to defend this thesis against two of the five
fundamental objections commonly raised against it: the not-so threatening
Argument from Other Times and the much more insidious Argument from
Relations. My rebuttal of the Argument from Other Times is based on an
analysis of the interrelation between Presentism and the
Aristotelianism-vs.-Platonism debate on the ontological status of time. My
counterargument to the Argument from Relations will be twofold. The first
bit is based on the rejection of the fundamental assumption in the
argument, i. e., a variant of the correspondence theory of truth; the
second bit consists in arguing that causal interactions are simultaneous.
"Een wereld zonder standen van zaken" (VU Amsterdam, The Netherlands, April 2003). In Dutch. A much shorter - but much improved - version of the paper following just after this one. Here's the
Samenvatting. De wereld, zegt Wittgenstein in de Tractatus, is de totaliteit van de feiten, niet van de dingen. Of, zoals Armstrong zegt, de wereld is een wereld van standen van zaken. Dat de zon in de hemel boven ons schijnt, dat het kopje tegenover me koffie bevat, in het algemeen dat zo en zo (het geval) is, zijn allemaal (beschrijvingen van) standen van zaken, die onze wereld 'constitueren'.
Waarom hebben wij standen van zaken nodig? Om waarheid ontologisch te gronden, volgens Armstrong, want proposities zijn waar krachtens iets in de wereld. Niet krachtens dingen, eigenschappen of relaties los van elkaar, maar krachtens verbindingen ervan: standen van zaken, die dingen, eigenschappen en relaties 'samenlijmen'.
Deze positie lijkt aantrekkelijk. Toch zal ik een poging doen om aan te tonen dat standen van zaken niet nodig zijn, en dat de wereld dus een wereld zonder standen van zaken is.
The audience reacted vehemently against the 'dus' and claimed: if you show that some entities are superfluous you have not yet showed that such entities are not there. How can this hold for assumed metaphysical entities like states of affairs?
"A World without States of Affairs" (Univ. Nijmegen, The Netherlands, March 2003). The title I took from an article of Peter Simons' in Italian, "Un mondo senza stati di cose" which strongly inspired this and which I extensively used here. I also used an excellent paper by William Vallicella.
"Twardowski's Misunderstandings of Bolzano and its Polish Consequences" (Bolzano Atelier, Geneva, Switzerland, Fall 2002)-
This paper is available for comments on request. )As of October 2003 I submitted a part of it as a separate short paper of about 3000 words.
Abstract - When Twardowski came to Lvov, he had to establish a philosophical
trend, which was almost entirely Brentanian, although peppered with Bolzanian
ideas. The overall trend was even more Brentanian than Twardowski himself
was when he left Vienna, and his choice impeded a rapid and global reception
of Bolzano's most modern logical discoveries. Although Twardowski played definitely
a major role in disseminating some of Bolzano's ideas in Poland, the most
important being sempiternal truth, Bolzano was still too much a logician among
many. It was only thanks to platonistic inputs from the outside, namely Husserl
and Twardowski's student Lukasiewicz, and to the change in the conception
of logic which took Polish logic from Sigwart to Tarski, that Bolzano's star
could, slowly, begin to rise in Poland. Or, at least, that the fundamental
achievements of his logic could be known. This paper will not, for the most
part, discuss Bolzanian elements in the Polish tradition, some of which have
already been discussed elsewhere. In the first part it will mainly challenge
the standard picture of the all-Brentanian origins of the Polish school, due
to a one-sided perspective caused by a specific reading of the ideas of Twardowski
and of his role as a founding father of the Polish School; this part will
also contribute to set a background for Bolzano's reception in Poland; in
the second part it will discuss, for the first time, two Bolzanian elements
in Twardowski, and in the early writings of Lesniewski, Lukasiewicz and Kotarbinski,
linked to the form of truth-bearers and to truth-makers. Special attention
is here given to an important manuscript by Twardowski in German, Logik
Editorial Activities (in Progress)
Kazimierz Twardowski, Logik1894/5
(Logic - Vienna Lecture Notes 1894/5) edition of the German
manuscript, introduction and footnotes with Venanzio Raspa, in preparation.
Kazimierz Twardowski, Logika - Wyklady Lwowskie
1895/6 (Logic - Lvov Lecture Notes 1895/6) edition of the Polish
manuscript and footnotes, introduction, in progress.
Stanislaw Lesniewski, Trzy zapomniane recenzje (1913-1916), foreword, editionand footnotes.
Jan Lukasiewicz, On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle,
transl. from Polish by Audoenus O. V. LeBlanc (proofreading only).
Roman Ingarden, "L'uomo e il tempo", in: Mauro Antonelli (ed.) Il tempo come soggetto - il soggetto come tempo. La temporalita nell'orizzonte fenomenologico, Bologna: CLUEB, 2003. Italian Translation of "Czlowiek i czas", in "Ksiazeczka o czlowieku", Kraków: WL, 1972.